Consumer Responses to Price Disclosure in Direct-to-Consumer Pharmaceutical Advertising
In the "American Patients First" 1 blueprint released in May 2018, the Trump administration proposed including the drug price in any direct-to-consumer pharmaceutical advertising (DTCPA) as an approach to lower prescription drug prices. In October 2018, the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services proposed requiring that television DTCPA disclose drug prices. 2 We conducted a behavioral experiment to understand how consumers are likely to respond to the price disclosure.
Methods | We recruited participants using Amazon's Mechanical Turk, 3 an online job board commonly used to enlist experiment Because society membership information generally was not publicly available and the Association of American Medical Colleges (AAMC) did not report workforce data in every specialty grouping or every year during the study period, the percentages of women physicians in active practice as reported by the AAMC are only available for 2010 (30.4%), 2 2013 (32.6%), 3 and 2015 (34.0%). 1 Error bars indicate the 95% CIs for the percentage of women among presidential leaders.
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Supplemental content participants. Participants were instructed to assume they had recently been diagnosed as having type 2 diabetes. They were randomly assigned to view 1 of 5 advertisements for a fictitious diabetes prescription drug ("Mayzerium"). Representing the current practice, the advertisement in the control condition made no mention of the drug's price. The remaining 4 advertisements disclosed either a low ($50 per month) or high ($15 500 per month) price, representing the 1st and 99th percentiles, respectively, of the average wholesale price in 2016 of diabetic prescription drugs. 4 In 2 "modifier" conditions, the advertisement included a modifying statement with the disclosed price indicating that "eligible patients may be able to get Mayzerium for as little as $0 per month" (the advertisements are available in the eAppendix in the Supplement). Such language commonly appears on advertisements for drug coupons and co-pay/ coinsurance assistance cards. This study received institutional review board approval from Clemson University. All participants provided implied consent by participating in the survey.
After viewing the advertisement, participants completed a questionnaire to measure their likelihood (ranging from 1 [highly unlikely] to 7 [highly likely]) of asking their physician about the drug, asking their insurer about the drug, researching the drug online, and taking the drug. Pairwise comparisons of responses were conducted using Wilcoxon rank sum tests. In addition, participants were asked about the expected out-of-pocket cost and the perceived effectiveness of the drug (ranging from 1 [highly ineffective] to 7 [highly effective]). They also answered demographic questions, and each received $0.50 as compensation for participation.
Results | Our sample included 580 participants, representing a wide range of ages, household incomes, education, insurance coverage, and health ( Table 1) . For the low-priced drug, the price disclosure, with or without the modifier, did not alter consumer responses. For the high-priced drug, the price disclosure significantly reduced the likelihood of participants asking their physician about the drug (5.12 vs 2.90; P < .001), asking their insurer about the drug (5.01 vs 4.09; P = .003), researching the drug online (5.94 vs 4.92; P < .001), and taking the drug (4.93 vs 3.24; P < .001) ( Table 2) . However, these results were significantly mitigated when the modifier was included: asking their physician about the drug (2.90 vs 4.48; P < .001), asking their insurer about the drug (4.09 vs 4.85; P = .01), researching the drug online (4.92 vs 5.74; P = .003), and taking the drug (3.24 vs 4.36; P < .001). Participants did not perceive the low-priced drug as significantly less effective than the high-priced drug. Results were robust when controlling for all demographic variables listed in Table 1 .
Our study had some limitations. First, actual patients might respond differently than experiment participants. Second, our results might not be generalizable to drugs of other therapeutic classes, in different price ranges, or using other marketing strategies in DTCPA. Third, clinician responses to price disclosures were outside the scope of this study.
Discussion | While price disclosure had little influence on consumer responses to the low-priced drug, it substantially decreased con- b Participants who indicated they did not have health insurance or were unsure whether they had a high-deductible health plan were considered as not having a high-deductible health plan.
c Participants who indicated they did not have health insurance or were unsure whether they had prescription drug coverage were considered as not having prescription drug coverage.
sumer interest in the high-priced drug. However, this finding weakened if the advertisement included a modifier indicating that consumers' out-of-pocket cost might be zero. Although many challenges remain in designing the ultimate US Food and Drug Administration regulation, 6 our results suggest that requiring pharmaceutical companies to disclose the price in DCTPA can be potentially effective in reducing consumer interest in high-priced drugs, but the inclusion of modifiers in these disclosures can reduce or eliminate the influence of disclosure. 
Estimates of the Number of Brand-name Drugs Affected by the Medicaid Rebate Cap in 2017
The Trump Administration has proposed uncapping Medicaid rebates to discourage drug price spikes. Drug manufacturers pay rebates to offset Medicaid pharmacy reimbursement, including a base rebate (23.1% of average manufacturer price [AMP] ) and an inflation rebate to counterbalance price increases above inflation. The cap, which was implemented in 2010, limits the total rebate to the drug's AMP, restricting manufacturer rebates for price increases more than 433% above inflation (ie, when the AMP equals 23.1% of AMP plus the difference between AMP and inflation-adjusted initial AMP). In this study, I estimated the number of brand-name drugs that had capped Medicaid payment rebates in 2017 and the total additional rebates without the cap. a Two-tailed Wilcoxon rank-sum tests were conducted to determine whether the median value of the column is statistically different from the median value of the "No Price" column.
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b Two-tailed Wilcoxon rank-sum tests were conducted to determine whether the median value of the column is statistically different from the median value of the "Low Price: Without Modifier" column.
c Two-tailed Wilcoxon rank-sum tests were conducted to determine whether the median value of the column is statistically different from the median value of the "High Price: Without Modifier" column.
d Ranging from 1 (highly unlikely) to 7 (highly likely). 5 e P < .001.
f P < .01.
g P < .05.
h Ranging from 1 (highly ineffective) to 7 (highly effective). To estimate the number of drugs that triggered the cap, I identified the first full year of reimbursement data (ie, the second year of data) using a commercial database to link identifiers (National Drug Code) over time. Then, I calculated the inflation rebate for 2017 (the difference between the inflation-adjusted initial estimated AMP and the current estimated AMP) and identified all drugs whose total rebate exceeded the estimated AMP. I also calculated the amount above the cap (reduced rebate).
Results | Of the 1705 brand-name drugs assessed, 271 drugs (15.9%; 250 non-5i drugs and 21 5i drugs) at the National Drug Code level triggered the cap, reducing rebate payments to Medicaid by US$103 540 808 ($52 619 984 non-5i drugs and $50 920 914 5i drugs) ( Table) in 2017. Seventy-five drugs (27.7%) had reduced rebates of greater than $100 000, and 85% of the reduced rebates were attributable to 25 drugs; diabetes treatments accounted for 46% of reduced rebates. Of the reduced rebates, 38% ($39 787 620) were attributable 
Invited Commentary Tepid Steps on Drug Pricing
Almost 2 years have passed since then President-elect Trump charged that prescription drug manufacturers were "getting away with murder." Yet little on the drug pricing landscape has changed. Although several brand-name manufacturers have touted their recent restraint on raising existing drug prices, their actions have largely constituted token gestures. In July 2018, for example, Roche pledged not to raise its prices for the remainder of the year, but only after having marked up many products; by contrast, Merck cut some prices, but only on drugs totaling 0.1% of its revenue. 1 Of the top 10 selling brand-name drugs in 2017 worldwide, 8 have increased a mean of 7.8% in wholesale acquisition cost since late 2017 (Table) . Meanwhile, launch prices for new drugs have continued to rise. The latter half of 2017 witnessed the introduction of the novel chimeric antigen receptor (CAR) T-cell treatments tisagenlecleucel (Kymriah) and axicabtagene ciloleucel (Yescarta), priced at $475 000 and $373 000, respectively, for a one-time infusion. In early 2018, Spark Therapeutics announced that it would charge $850 000 for 2 injections of voretigene neparvovec (Luxturna), a gene therapy for inherited vision loss.
The burden of such high prices, already large, appears poised to grow. In a 2017 survey of 199 patients prescribed insulin, 25% reported cost-related underuse. 2 One commercial health plan recently reported that prescription drugs comprised one-fourth of its health care spending, 3 and the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services projected that net US spending on prescription drugs would increase faster than any other major health care good or service over the next decade. 4 In response to widespread public concern, the Department of Health and Human Services published a blueprint last spring recommending several measures to improve price negotiation and competition. While these steps have been highly publicized, none are likely to move the needle to a measurable degree in reforming drug pricing. In some cases, the administration has worked against its own rhetoric by not supporting potentially useful ideas. For example, the blueprint calls on the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) to issue guidance on combating the misuse of risk evaluation and mitigation strategies to delay generic competition, but the administration and FDA commissioner have been silent on stalled bipartisan legislation that would accomplish this goal-the CREATES Act-which the Congressional Budget (2) an inflation rebate, the difference between the AMP and the inflation-adjusted launch price. The lesser known inflation rebate has enabled state Medicaid programs to pay far less than other payers on older brand-name drugs, which include some still widely used biologic drugs approved 2 or more decades ago that remain expensive because they lack effective biosimilar competition. 8 However, in 2010, these combined rebates were capped so that manufacturers would not have to pay back more than the AMP. Dickson 6 found that 271 of 1705 brandname drugs (15.9%) hit this cap in 2017, resulting in $103 million in forgone savings. While any potential savings are useful to Medicaid programs, Medicaid spent $29.6 billion on prescription drugs in 2016, and the author noted that removing the cap would have lowered manufacturer drug-specific revenues by only 2% to 9%, suggesting that the reform would not serve as a meaningful deterrent to further drug price increases. Garrett et al 7 evaluated the possible influence of a proposal made by the administration and others to mandate disclosure of drug list prices in direct-to-consumer advertising. Using a fictional diabetes drug, the investigators randomly assigned 580 people who agreed to take surveys on Amazon's Mechanical Turk platform and offered them 50-cent honoraria to pretend to be patients with type 2 diabetes and view 1 of 5 advertisements: those without a list price, those with a low list price without and with further disclosure of possible co-payment support, and those with a high list price without and with further disclosure of possible co-payment support. The authors found that, while list price disclosure reduced the likelihood of participants reporting that they would ask about, investigate, or take the high-priced drug, inclusion of a notice of possible co-payment support diminished the influence. Both studies have key limitations. Dickson 6 used the amount of the forgone rebate as a proxy for the relative profitability of not implementing a price increase. This assumption depends in part on the proportion of overall drug sales to Medicaid, as well as the price elasticity of demand in the commercial market: the smaller the proportion of overall drug sales to Medicaid and the more inelastic the demand in the commercial market (ie, the less price changes affect demand), the less well the assumption holds. Garrett et al 7 used an online survey population not representative of the US population, and it is unclear whether their responses would translate to how actual patients with diabetes (or any medical condition) might perceive and respond to advertisements. As unjustified increases in drug prices continue to harm patients and payers, the data the authors generate offer some empirical support for claims that the administration needs stronger tools. Such a disconnect reflects a missed opportunity, particularly given widespread public support for government intervention to lower drug prices. How could the administration be bolder? It could charge Congress to extend the Medicaid inflation rebate to Medicare's Part D program, which accounts for about 30% of US retail prescription drug spending. To prevent drug manufacturers from simply increasing launch prices, this action would likely have to be coupled with better grounding of launch prices on demonstrated value. Combined, these steps may incentivize manufacturers to place greater focus on innovation rather than relying on markups of older products to sustain revenue projections for shareholders.
Evolving First Amendment commercial speech jurisprudence makes addressing drug pricing through direct-to-consumer advertising challenging. Rather than compelling disclosure of list prices, the administration could press Congress to earmark some funding in the planned reauthorization of the Patient-Centered Outcomes Research Institute in 2019 for academic detailing, which could help foster more evidence-based prescribing as an "antidote" to ubiquitous direct-to-consumer advertisements. 9 Similarly, the Department of Health and Human Services could underwrite efforts to educate consumers about therapeutic options for various conditions and their comparative cost-effectiveness. A new deal is ultimately needed for Americans to ensure affordable access to life-saving therapies. The administration would do well to revise its blueprint, aiming higher. 
